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CH ALLENGING TH E
MANDATE OF H EAVEN
Popular P rotest in Modern China
E l izabeth J. P erry
Arguing that popular protest has played an unusual role in bestowing political legiti-
macy in China, this article traces continuities in state responses to protest move-
ments from imperial days to the present. The author compares the government’s re-
cent handling of three different types of protest: economically motivated actions by
hard-pressed workers and farmers, nationalistically inspired demonstrations by pa-
triotic students, and (at greater length) religiously rooted resistance by zealous be-
lievers. The central authorities’ tolerance toward localized strikes and tax riots, and
their overt encouragement of protests against the bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade, contrasts sharply with the harsh and unrelenting campaign of repres-
sion that has been directed against Falun Gong adherents. Explanations for these
variant state responses are sought in historically grounded assessments of the politi-
cal implications of different types of popular protest.
No country boasts a more enduring or more colorful history of rebellion and
revolution than China. The Chinese tradition of popular upheaval stretches
back well beyond this century; indeed, records allow us to trace it as far back as
209 B.C.E. when the Chen She Rebellion helped to topple the mighty Qin em-
pire and give rise to the famous Han dynasty. Over the ensuing millennia, popu-
lar protest has formed a constant and consequential theme in Chinese political
history.
China’s impressive record of rebellion and revolution is due not simply to
the country’s extraordinary size and longevity, but also to the fact that central el-
ements in Chinese political culture have directly encouraged such protests. The
Confucian (or Mencian, to be precise) concept of a “Mandate of Heaven”
(tianming) bestowed instant legitimacy upon successful rebel leaders. This
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pragmatic precept differed markedly from European notions of a “divine right
of kings” and the Japanese belief in an unbroken line of rulers descending from
the Sun Goddess, myths that militated against challenges to the powers-that-be.
In imperial China, one who managed to wrest the throne by force thereby
gained Confucian sanction for his rule; as the proverb put it bluntly, “He who
succeeds is a king or marquis; he who fails is an outlaw.” Of course this did not
mean that imperial aspirants were free to ignore cultural or normative bounds.
Future emperors were expected to demonstrate their claim to the Mandate by
means of various divine omens and needed to come to terms with Confucian
elites if they were to harbor any hope of a long-lived reign. Still, the relative
openness of the system stood in stark contrast to that of other imperial orders.
Political challengers in China — be they peasants or foreign invaders — were
permitted to make a bid for kingship through popular rebellion.
Although Confucianism was largely discredited in the twentieth century, the
connection between mass protest and political legitimacy remained intact. Sun
Yat-sen’s “Three Principles of the People” helped inspire the 1911 Revolution
that toppled two thousand years of imperial rule, while Mao Zedong’s doctrine
of “People’s War” fueled the Communist victory in 1949 — just as his subse-
quent call for “continuing the revolution” provided justification of a Cultural
Revolution in the mid-sixties. Indeed, one of the principal differences between
Chinese and Soviet Communism lies in the former’s emphasis on mass criticism
and mass campaigns. Like Mencius’s Mandate of Heaven, Mao’s Mass Line in-
sisted on the reciprocal linkage between leader and led in staking a claim to
higher political morality. Whereas Stalin looked to the secret police to enforce
top-down order, Mao repeatedly called upon the Chinese masses to engage in
class struggle from below. This certainly did not mean that the People’s Repub-
lic under Mao eschewed the use of state surveillance — quite the contrary — but
it was unusual among Communist countries in also requiring ordinary citizens
to participate actively in government-sponsored campaigns.
Many assumed that the death of Chairman Mao would spell an end to the im-
portance of mass movements in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Deng
Xiaoping announced soon after his accession to power that the era of mass cam-
paigns was indeed over. Actually, however, popular protests — some with at
least implicit higher-level encouragement — have continued to punctuate the
history of the PRC in the post-Mao period. The Democracy Wall movement of
1978-79 , the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 1985, the anti-American protests
of 1999, and even the student uprising of 1989 were all stimulated in part by the
expectation of support from elements of the central leadership. Although Mao’s
successors have been less active in instigating political unrest than was the
Great Helmsman himself, protesters remain unusually attentive to signals from
the central leadership.
Moreover, alongside these expressly political initiatives have occurred a host
of other protests — from tax riots to sectarian resistance — that share a remark-
able resemblance to patterns of unrest so familiar to students of imperial and
Republican China. Farmers have banded together in assaults on tax bureaus to
protest the imposition of exorbitant surcharges. Workers have launched strikes
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and slowdowns to signal their dissatisfaction with factory closures and atten-
dant layoffs. Religious sectarians have insisted on practicing their spiritual
regimens in bold defiance of government proscriptions.
In light of China’s rich and variegated traditions of resistance, rebellion, and
revolution, we should be duly skeptical of claims (such as those proffered by
many observers during the Tiananmen uprising of 1989) that new outbursts of
protest represent a fundamental break with the past. Although initial reactions
to the 1989 “democracy movement” stressed its novelty, subsequent reflections
on the activities of the protesters — including retrospectives by the principals
themselves — questioned the extent to which their behavior constituted a gen-
uine rupture with earlier modes of protest. As Tiananmen activist Liu Xiaobo
later conceded,
Most of the resources and methods we made use of to mobilize the masses
were ones that the Communist Party itself had used many times be-
fore.…As soon as we began our revolution, we became extremely con-
ceited — just as if we had reverted to the time of the Cultural Revolution
and felt ourselves to be the most revolutionary. As soon as we joined the
1989 protest movement, we considered ourselves to be the most demo-
cratic. After all, had we not fasted for democracy and devoted ourselves to
it and made sacrifices for it?…Our voice became the only truth. We felt as
though we possessed absolute power.1
Liu’s impassioned reflections are a stinging indictment of the Tiananmen
protest as an undemocratic movement that unwittingly recreated many of the
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Democracy Wall, Beijing. “The Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, the anti-Japanese
demonstrations of 1985, the anti-American protests of 1999, and even the student upris-
ing of 1989 were all stimulated in part by the expectation of support from elements of the
central leadership.” (Photo courtesy of Amnesty International/Kristina M. Torgeson. URL: < http://
www.amnesty-usa.org/amnesty/asa/china/torgeson.html> .)
worst features of Chinese Communist political culture. He suggests that what
masqueraded as the sprouts of civil society (e.g., autonomous student and
worker associations) or as novel cultural practices (e.g., weddings on the
Square) were in reality little more than variations on the repressive theme of
Chinese Communist convention. The searing experience of the Cultural Revo-
lution in particular, according to Liu Xiaobo, has inhibited the development of
a genuinely democratic perspective among Chinese intellectuals.
While Liu’s critique is a poignant reminder that societal initiatives in China
continue to reflect the heavy hand of statist influences, we should not thereby
conclude that popular protest is forever fated to serve merely as the hand-
maiden of Communist control. During the 1989 protests, for example, the au-
tonomous workers’ federations that sprang up around the country represented
a heightened level of antagonism between organized labor and the state in con-
temporary China.
Challenging the Mandate of Heaven was never easy, but it did periodically oc-
cur — in both ancient and modern times. History suggests that a key to the suc-
cess of such undertakings lay in bridging the (often state-imposed) categories
that set various groups of people against one another. Such divisions, although
responsible for much of the unrest that has colored the Chinese past, also posed
serious obstacles to concerted popular imagination and action against the state.
To overcome these hurdles required the intervention of farsighted individuals,
who often issued from the lower rungs of the intelligentsia or local elite.
Whether drawn from the ranks of students, teachers, militia captains, religious
masters, bandit chieftains, or Communist cadres, such leaders have played a
catalytic role in converting ongoing strategies of competition into large-scale
political movements. The state, too, was a critical variable in the equation; a
poorly executed repression effort could stimulate, rather than stymie, the spirit
of political protest.
Expectations of Stabi l i ty
The advent of a new millennium affords an opportune occasion to take stock of
the historical legacy of Chinese protest and its continuing impact on the con-
temporary scene. The PRC has certainly seen its share of mass movements,
many (but by no means all) of which were elite-inspired, if not overtly insti-
gated. According to government pronouncements, however, 1999 was to be dif-
ferent. As the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC, the final year of the
old millennium was supposed to be protest-free — a time for officially orches-
trated parades, but not for unofficial demonstrations. Stability, rather than
spontaneity, was the watchword of the day.
The year 1999 was seen as potentially problematic not only because it
marked a half-century milestone in the history of Communist China, but also be-
cause it was a banner anniversary year for other critical events in the record of
Chinese protests: the eightieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of
1919, the fortieth anniversary of the Tibetan Revolt of 1959, the thirtieth anni-
versary of the conclusion of the mass mobilization phase of the Cultural Revolu-
tion in 1969, the twentieth anniversary of the Democracy Wall movement of
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1979, the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen uprising and its bloody June 4
suppression in 1989. Inasmuch as the commemoration of anniversaries is itself
a common pretext for protest in China, the year was approached with trepida-
tion by the leadership.2 To ensure that potential protesters had no space in
which to mark these anniversaries, Tiananmen Square was closed for renova-
tions until shortly before the October 1 National Day celebrations. As things de-
veloped, however, before the curtain could be rung down on the old millen-
nium, China was rocked with all manner of protests: tax revolts by farmers in
the countryside, petition drives by laid-off workers and displaced residents in
the cities, student demonstrations against the NATO bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, and even a convocation of religious sectarians right out-
side the central leadership compound of Zhongnanhai.
Despite its avowed intention to oppose all forms of protest, the state actually
responded in quite different ways to these various expressions of popular dis-
content.3 The government ruthlessly repressed the Falun Gong believers who
had amassed peacefully outside Zhongnanhai on April 25, despite the fact that
they were arguably the least violent of all the demonstrations that occurred in
China that year. Toward the protests by farmers and workers, the authorities
showed a considerable degree of tolerance. And officials actively encouraged
the student protests that erupted after the Belgrade bombing of May 8.
These seemingly contradictory government responses make considerably
more sense if viewed in historical perspective. The central government’s muted
response to the protests by farmers and workers has an ancient pedigree. From
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A protestor tries to break police lines in front of the U.S. embassy in Beijing on Sunday, 9
May 1999. “In the case of the 1999 student protests against the [NATO] bombing of
China’s Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government sup-
port — sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing buses to take stu-
dents to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying the slogans that they
should shout once they got there.” (AP/Wide World Photos/Chien-min Chung)
imperial days to the present, economic protests demanding a secure livelihood
were generally seen as a signal of local distress that should be dealt with by
grassroots officials. As Mencius had emphasized, it was the responsibility of gov-
ernment to provide for the people’s welfare. But since economic difficulties
tended to be localized, the onus of alleviating them fell to local-level officials —
county magistrates or provincial governors. Similarly, today it is the mayor of
Chongqing municipality or the magistrate of Renshou county who is expected
to cope with petitions by laid-off workers or tax revolts by hard-pressed farmers.
“Moral economy” protests launched in the name of subsistence have oc-
curred with remarkable frequency in recent years in both rural and urban
China. In 1993, for instance, according to a top-level government report the
countryside witnessed some 1.7 million cases of resistance, primarily tax resis-
tance, of which 6,230 cases were classified as “disturbances” (naoshi) that en-
tailed severe damage to persons or property. The confrontations that year ex-
acted a staggering toll of deaths and injuries on some 8,200 township and
county officials.4 Farmers were not alone in expressing economic grievances. In
the final decade of the twentieth century, according to official statistics, more
than 1.5 million industrial disputes were officially recorded and processed by
arbitration or mediation committees.5 Since many more disputes occur than are
officially registered, we can assume an impressive level of labor strife as well.
So long as such confrontations limit their demands to calling for a decent
livelihood and so long as they remain localized, the central government has
generally stayed out of the picture — except to encourage local officials to deal
fairly with the protesters. In the case of a taxicab drivers’ strike in the city of
Changsha, for example, central authorities intervened to persuade the munici-
pal government to rescind its plan to raise license fees to a level beyond the
means of many drivers. When tax revolts by farmers have prompted central in-
tervention, it has usually been to remind township and county governments
that their fees and surcharges must not exceed 5 percent of farmers’ income, as
stipulated by national regulations (which have been widely ignored).6
In short, the central government — like its predecessors in imperial and Re-
publican China — has demonstrated a certain degree of tolerance and even
sympathy toward economically driven protests, provided that they remain
clearly bounded in both scale and aspirations. Claims to a basic subsistence that
stay within local confines have seldom been deemed especially threatening by
Chinese regimes, and so — in contrast to protests motivated by explicitly reli-
gious or political agendas — historically have not attracted a great deal of cen-
tral anxiety or attention.
Nationalistically inspired student unrest is another story altogether, how-
ever. In the case of the 1999 student protests against the bombing of China’s
Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government
support — sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing
buses to take students to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying
the slogans that they should shout once they got there. Here, too, the historical
lessons are telling. Patriotic student movements have proved politically incen-
diary in China ever since the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century opened
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Chinese governments to charges of being soft on imperialism. The May Fourth
Movement of 1919, which railed against Japanese incursions after World War I,
resulted in the dismissal of the three discredited officials who had signed the
Treaty of Versailles. More importantly, it helped give rise to the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) itself. The Communist revolution was also at core a move-
ment of nationalistically inspired students, who subsequently reached out to
other allies — first workers, then peasants — in an effort to topple a govern-
ment that they charged was remiss in its responsibility to guard China’s na-
tional sovereignty.
The current regime is thus deeply afraid of jingoistic student movements, es-
pecially if they seem likely to link up with other social groups, and only a few
years ago it banned student demonstrations that called for recovering the
Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands from Japanese control. But with the bombing on 8
May 1999 having created visible martyrs, it was simply too hazardous for the
government to try to disallow student demonstrations altogether. Moreover,
the incident occurred only four days after the May Fourth anniversary (and less
than a month before June Fourth) when historical parallels were on everyone’s
mind.7 Jiang Zemin — like his predecessors in 1919 — risked being accused of
failing to protect Chinese sovereignty unless he seemed to be responding at
least as vigorously as the students to this affront to national pride. And thus,
within hours of the news of the bombing, the regime reversed its policy of dis-
couraging all forms of student activism and allowed, even encouraged, edu-
cated youths to take to the streets to express their patriotic outrage. What better
way for Jiang Zemin and company to reclaim the glorious mantle of nationalism
that had once enveloped their party.
Falun Gong
Let us turn now, and at greater length, to the Falun Gong campaign — where the
authorities adopted a policy of harsh repression, in contrast to the tacit toler-
ance that they showed toward small-scale economic protests by workers and
farmers or the overt support that they provided to nationalistic students. Even
more than in these other instances, the Falun Gong case is replete with histori-
cal resonance.
As the suppression campaign against Falun Gong suggests, the Chinese state
recognizes the dangers inherent in cross-class and cross-territorial expressions
of popular protest. While geographically confined movements aimed at improv-
ing the economic lot of one social group are (and were) countenanced, move-
ments that spill across jurisdictional and/or occupational boundaries are (and
were) viewed as cause for serious central concern. Imperial edicts condemned
sectarian groups not only for their heterodox beliefs, but also for their tendency
to attract itinerants and merchants as well as settled peasants, to encourage in-
termingling of the sexes, and to uproot people from their assigned places in the
social hierarchy. The breaching of “proper” societal divisions was — along with
heterodoxy — grounds for severe repression.
The government-directed campaign against Falun Gong (or “Wheel of Law”
as it is often rendered into English) is reminiscent both of Maoist campaigns
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against alleged “counter-revolutionaries” and of
earlier, imperial initiatives against allegedly “het-
erodox” sectarians. Inasmuch as the current re-
gime tries to distinguish itself sharply from such
antecedents, the campaign has exposed a host of
ironies that raise the question of just how mod-
ern and reformist the post-Mao leadership actu-
ally is. In striking out against the Wheel of Law,
were Jiang Zemin and company simply reinvent-
ing the familiar wheel of repression of heterodox
sects forged by their predecessors? And does his-
tory offer any clues as to the likely consequences
of this heavy-handed state response?
Government propaganda against the practice
of Falun Gong dominated both the air waves and the print media for weeks after
the campaign got under way in July of 1999. Thousands were reportedly sent to
labor camps, and hundreds to prison, in conjunction with the crackdown.
Dozens may have died at the hands of the police. This was of course hardly the
first time that the post-Mao authorities had struck out against allegedly “sectar-
ian” activities. During the past two decades, the government has cracked down
on all manner of secret societies and underground religious groups as well as
on rebellions inspired by a variety of folk beliefs.8 The fear of qigong practices
(or breathing and martial arts exercises) turning into political protests is also
not a new concern for the post-Mao leadership. At the time of the 1989 demon-
strations, government hotlines were established in the major cities to encour-
age citizens to report any suspicious behavior by qigong masters.9 Nevertheless,
the launching of a full-scale campaign against a single organization of this sort is
indeed unprecedented. Not since the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries
Campaign in the early 1950s have we seen such sustained national attention di-
rected to the threat of sectarian resistance, and never before have we witnessed
an attack of this kind on but a single target.
Why did the leadership elect to undertake this drastic initiative — an initia-
tive so out of step with its attitude toward labor disputes, tax riots, or even stu-
dent nationalistic demonstrations? Timing, scale, and composition help to ac-
count for the difference. As noted earlier, the year 1999 was approached as a
moment of potential trouble by the PRC authorities. Public security officials
surely thought they had eliminated the threat of mass demonstrations in the
capital when they closed Tiananmen Square for renovations during the first half
of the year, conveniently preventing would-be protesters from commemorating
May Fourth — or, more dangerous still, June Fourth — at the site of those his-
toric events. Thus they were shocked when 10,000 Falun Gong adherents from
all over the country and all walks of life suddenly materialized in front of the
leadership compound of Zhongnanhai to demand official recognition of their
religious association. While the government had shown increasing flexibility to-
ward localized, interest-based protests in recent years (e.g., demonstrations by
laid-off workers at particular factories or in particular cities), it remained deeply
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In the Falun emblem the
swastika symbol represents the
Buddha School and the Taiji
(Yin-Yang) symbols represent
the Tao School.
fearful of cross-regional and/or cross-class actions. Hence the roundup in 1999
of Democracy Party activists (who had established branches across the country
with participation from workers as well as intellectuals), and hence the antipa-
thy toward Falun Gong. That the Internet was evidently serving as a mobiliza-
tional weapon for Falun Gong practitioners, as it had for Democracy Party mem-
bers as well, was also highly disturbing to the leadership. This new means of
communication was capable of easily transcending spatial and occupational
barriers and was also stubbornly resistant to state surveillance efforts.
Of further concern was the fact that so many Falun Gong adepts were mem-
bers of the Communist Party, including high-level officials in the government
and army. Although participation (and even leadership) by party cadres and PLA
soldiers in sectarian unrest is by no means unprecedented, in the past those in-
volved were generally low-level officials without national influence. In this case,
however, the former director of the 301st Army Hospital in Beijing — a doctor
with considerable standing among the political elite — had been advising
high-level cadres to turn to Falun Gong. At a time when CCP leaders find them-
selves ideologically adrift and presiding over an increasingly moribund party
apparatus, the emergence of a large social movement whose diverse member-
ship exhibits remarkable commitment and enthusiasm, has the capacity to mo-
bilize on a nationwide scale, and maintains secure international communica-
tions, is anything but a welcome development.
Here, too, historical memories are disturbing. Much of the explanation for
the Communists’ rapid rise to victory half a century ago lay in the defection of so
many elements of the ancien regime. When Guomindang members at all levels
began to go over to the Communist side, the civil war tilted decisively in favor of
the revolutionaries.10 Thus Jiang Zemin was understandably wary of the fact that
many CCP members had joined the Falun Gong.
Whether one interprets the regime’s reaction against Falun Gong as rational
suspicion or as irrational paranoia, the contradictions of the campaign have laid
bare many of the ironies of Communist rule. When the campaign was first
launched, the authorities declared Falun Gong to be a “heterodox religion”
(xiejiao) — the traditional term employed by the imperial Chinese state to des-
ignate those groups, such as the millenarian White Lotus Society, whose prac-
tices were deemed antithetical to its own Confucian dictates. In such a dis-
course, “heterodox religion” is contrasted to “orthodox religion” — whether of
the Confucian or Communist persuasion. The initial wave of the campaign
counterposed the “heterodox” views of Falun Gong leader Li Hongzhi to the
correct tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Whereas Marxism-Leninism championed
materialism, Falun Gong espoused idealism. Rather than be misled by the false
teachings of the charismatic Li Hongzhi, citizens were enjoined to rally around
the central party leadership and its proper doctrines. Framing the problem in
this fashion had the unintended effect, however, of putting Falun Gong on a
roughly equal footing with the Communist Party. On the one side stood Li
Hongzhi and his heterodox teachings, on the other side the central leaders and
their orthodox teachings. In the interests of stability and unity, ordinary Chinese
were asked to reject Falun Gong in favor of the CCP.
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The unwitting implication was that two competing sects were locked in mor-
tal combat, each vying for the allegiance of the masses. When the state accused
Falun Gong of having caused numerous deaths through suicide, starvation, and
mental illness, one could hardly help but compare its record favorably against
the devastation wrought by Land Reform, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cul-
tural Revolution — not to mention the June Fourth massacre.
Perhaps it dawned on someone in the Ministry of Propaganda that this was
not a particularly flattering way in which to represent the Communist Party. In
any event, after a few days of this approach, the campaign took a new turn. In-
stead of contrasting Falun Gong “heterodoxy” to Communist “orthodoxy,” the
principal opposition was now presented as one of “superstition” versus “sci-
ence.” Prominent astronomers and physicists from the major universities and
research academies were trotted out to denounce Li Hongzhi’s apocalyptic
prophecies about the end of an age (moshilun). Whereas Li had allegedly pre-
dicted the advent of a comet that would generate a global explosion that only he
could deflect, scientists responded that the chances of such an occurrence that
year were a remote one in fifty billion. Nonetheless, they proceeded soberly to
calculate the precise force that Li Hongzhi would have to be able to muster in or-
der to repel such a comet were it in fact on its way, and pronounced his alleged
boast “impossible!” Meteorologists for the evening television news also took
care to reassure viewers that the partial lunar eclipse on July 28 was no cause for
alarm — despite popular beliefs that unusual astrological occurrences are a sign
of the loss of the Mandate of Heaven.
Physicians and psychiatrists testified to the deleterious physical and mental
health effects of Falun Gong. Television cameras took viewers inside mental in-
stitutions to observe cases of “qigong deviation” (qigong piancha), a Chinese
category of mental illness allegedly brought on by the practice of Falun Gong
techniques. Victims of Falun Gong, not previously noted for filling mental hos-
pitals, were now said to account for more than 40 percent of the patients in Chi-
nese psychiatric wards. Psychologists explained how continuous exposure to
the books, tapes, videos, Internet home page, and other paraphernalia of Falun
Gong could induce a “true believer” mentality in which followers would be will-
ing to follow blindly any command issued by the supreme leader.
To be sure, government officials were not without some justification in high-
lighting the bizarre belief system that underpinned the practice of Falun Gong.
Followers of the faith were said to derive therapeutic benefits from the regular
rotation of a spiritual wheel implanted in their stomachs by the charismatic au-
thority of Li Hongzhi. Those who mastered the regimens of the religion were
promised supernatural powers that ranged from levitation to x-ray vision. And,
unlike many other qigong groups, Falun Gong believers seemed to devote at
least as much energy to honoring their leader — who was invested with divine
attributes — as to honing their exercise skills.
Attuned to the international backlash that the repression campaign was
bound to generate, government television stations invited experts in law and
philosophy to explain that suppression of an unregistered, and thus illegal and
illegitimate, organization was not a violation of human rights. Social scientists
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testified that Falun Gong’s capacity to amass large numbers of otherwise uncon-
nected people simultaneously was a clear threat to the general social order —
something that could not be tolerated in any modern polity. Officially sanc-
tioned religious specialists decried the “feudal superstition” of Falun Gong, in
contrast to the “normal religion” that they themselves espoused.
For weeks after the campaign began, each night pictures were broadcast of
huge piles of Falun Gong materials that had been either voluntarily turned over
by practitioners or confiscated in police raids on bookstores and publishing
houses. (Interestingly, the People’s Liberation Army Press was responsible for a
number of Falun Gong publications.) Some were disposed of in gigantic bon-
fires, others were recycled. Relatives of Falun Gong victims testified about the
terrible tragedies that had befallen their loved ones. Former adherents also be-
gan to come forward to explain how they had been hoodwinked by Li Hongzhi
and to express regret at their gullibility. Physical education teachers pointed to
healthy alternatives to Falun Gong in the form of badminton, ballroom dancing,
bowling, and the like. Happy pictures of those who had kicked the Falun Gong
habit and were now pursuing more benign varieties of exercise began to flood
the evening news.
The basic patterns of the government’s offensive were familiar from decades
of previous such mobilized suppression efforts, from the anti-rightist campaign
of the 1950s to the anti-spiritual pollution campaigns of the 1980s. However,
judging from discussions with people in China at the time, this particular cam-
paign was not a resounding success. While most of those with whom I talked ac-
cepted that Falun Gong’s organizational capacities were a potential danger and
assumed that Li Hongzhi was a hustler with a nefarious agenda, be it political or
simply pecuniary, they found the government’s treatment of the case something
of a public embarrassment. The draconian nature of the campaign was suggestive
of a deeply frightened and insecure central leadership. People wondered out
loud: Had crimes so serious as to warrant the arrest of thousands really occurred?
The state produced no convincing evidence to demonstrate any actual dis-
ruption of public order from Falun Gong — aside from the fact that so many of
its own cadres had enlisted in the movement.11 Although the authorities tried to
argue that Falun Gong members were interfering with flood control work by
demonstrating outside public agencies, the television footage revealed that en-
trances and exits to public buildings had been kept conspicuously open by
Falun Gong protesters. The gatherings were non-violent and remarkably disci-
plined. While the government insisted that these demonstrations were the most
serious political threat since the 1989 student uprising, it was hard to see why.
The weakness of the state’s case was plain, its accusations rife with obvious
inconsistencies, ironies, and exaggerations. The government claimed to be jus-
tified in cracking down on the group because it was not officially registered, but
the Falun Gong demonstrations had been prompted precisely by a desire for
the official recognition and registration that the state refused to grant. The au-
thorities castigated Falun Gong for being feudal and un-scientific, while at the
same time denouncing its use of cutting-edge Internet technology to propagate
its message both nationally and internationally.
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H istor ical  Analogies
One of the greatest ironies of the campaign lay in the state’s reluctance to ac-
knowledge the historical considerations that so clearly lay behind its heavy-
handed reaction to Falun Gong. As everyone with whom I spoke was quick to
point out, the real fear was that the movement would turn into the sort of sectar-
ian-inspired rebellion for which Chinese history is famous. Indeed, by labeling
the group a “heterodox sect” (xiejiao) and cracking down relentlessly on its
practitioners, the authorities invited just such historical allusions. From the Yel-
low Turbans to the White Lotus to the Boxers, the folk religion and breathing
regimens of “heterodox sects” proved to be a volatile mix in times of dynastic
crisis. Although the official media did not draw attention to this historical anal-
ogy, it was certainly not lost on the public at large. The fact that a popular central
television serial chronicled the story of the first Ming emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang
— a mendicant monk whose fourteenth century rise to power came in the midst
of a White Lotus-inspired rebellion — served only to highlight the linkage be-
tween past and present. Fear of the loss of the Mandate of Heaven was generally
seen as the driving force behind the campaign, but this “feudal superstitious”
belief could of course not be officially admitted.
As the historical record teaches us, the vast majority of Chinese sectarian
groups were inclined toward political quiescence. The trigger for protest, more
often than not, lay with the state. Government repression was a common pre-
cipitant of overt rebellion.12 Thus if the current effort to eliminate Falun Gong
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Anti-Falun Gong posters. Designer: Cheng Guoying. From the collection of Stefan Landes-
berger. (Left) E13/892. Jianjue yonghu Zhongyang guanyu chuli “Falun Gong” feifa zuzhide
jueding [Firmly support the decision of the Central Committee to deal with the illegal orga-
nization of “Falun Gong”], Sichuan meishu chubanshe, August 1999, print no. 85410.
3590. (Right) E13/891. Chongshang kexue, pochu mixin [Uphold science, eradicate super-
stition],Sichuan meishu chubanshe, August 1999, print no. 85410.3589.
does not succeed, the authorities are likely to have turned a once tranquil friend
into an implacable and formidable foe. Like the anti-sectarian efforts of the
Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century, or for that matter of the Guomin-
dang earlier in the twentieth century, their heavy-handed initiatives against “het-
erodoxy” and “feudal superstition” may well prove counterproductive in the
long run.13
Whether or not the government prevails in its effort to eliminate Falun Gong
as an organization, the suppression campaign exposed profound vulnerabili-
ties in the state’s grip on society. Equally important, the sorts of demonstrations
sweeping China at the turn of the millennium — whether launched by qigong
practitioners or by anti-American students — served notice that popular protest
in China is not a carbon copy of the social movements familiar in Western societ-
ies. As analysts, we would do well to approach such expressions of public senti-
ment on their terms, rather than assume (as many outside observers did during
the Tiananmen demonstrations more than a decade ago) that the wellsprings of
political change lay only with those marching behind a replica of the Statue of
Liberty.
Throughout Chinese history, mass protests have played a special role in be-
stowing political legitimacy — whether according to Confucian or Communist
principles. This contributes to a distinctive dynamic of state-society relations.
On the one hand, Chinese political culture (whether framed in terms of the
Mencian Mandate of Heaven or in terms of Mao’s Mass Line) encourages and
empowers protesters to rise up from the ranks of society to challenge state lead-
ers. On the other hand, precisely because of the importance of popular protest
to political legitimacy, state authorities — be they emperors or general secretar-
ies of the Communist Party — move aggressively to condone or to condemn
particular outbreaks of protest activity. Popular demonstrations that go beyond
the articulation of local economic grievances are either welcomed as supportive
of the reigning orthodoxy or else they are banned as expressions of heterodox
superstition. As a result, Chinese protesters themselves are unusually attentive
to signals from the state. The request by Falun Gong adherents for official recog-
nition and registration is only the latest in a centuries-old tradition of appeals by
social movements for government approval.
The close relationship between state authorization and social movements in
China raises some questions concerning the applicability of general theories of
contentious politics, developed for the most part on the basis of European
and American cases. Although these theories have certainly not ignored the
role of the state, they have generally been content to suggest a negative correla-
tion between state strength and politically threatening social movements. Revo-
lutions, according to this line of analysis, are facilitated by weak states incapable
of repressing challenges to their own survival.14 There is, of course, an obvious
— possibly even tautological — logic to this insight that applies, at least in hind-
sight, to any revolutionary outcome. But the Chinese experience argues for ac-
knowledging a larger, more pro-active role for the state.
It is not just that state weakness may encourage protest; rather, popular pro-
tests are often inspired by the very strength of state exemplars. Take Falun
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Gong, whose organizational structure closely resembles that of the Chinese
Communist Party. In both cases, individuals belong to local branches whose
leaders are strictly subservient to the directives of the next level in a tightly orga-
nized, territorially based hierarchy. While ordinary members of one branch may
have little direct contact with members of other branches, their leaders are
plugged into an extremely effective system of communication and command.
Prior to the government crackdown, Falun Gong boasted more than 28,000 lo-
cal branches (known as liangongdian or practice points) whose leaders re-
ported to more than 1,900 supervisory stations (fudaozhan) that in turn re-
ported to thirty-nine general stations (zongzhan) at the level of province,
autonomous region, and municipality. At the center stood the Wheel of Law Re-
search Society (falun dafa yanjiuhui).
The structural isomorphism between Falun Gong and the Communist Party
was due not only to Falun Gong’s desire to elude state surveillance through a
dispersed cellular pattern (perfected by the CCP during its own revolutionary
years for a similar purpose). The congruence was due also to the fact that the
Communist Party represents an extremely powerful, indeed virtually irresist-
ible, organizational template for any group trying to operate in contemporary
China.
By the same token, territory designated as politically sacred by the Chinese
state exerts a tremendous pull on potential protesters. Thus, despite the enor-
mous dangers inherent in public assemblies at Tiananmen Square, members of
the outlawed Falun Gong movement are drawn back again and again to that site
precisely because it is the state-sanctioned political center of the country. A
Reuters report during the lunar New Year’s celebrations in February 2000
makes clear this magnetic, mimetic connection between the Chinese state and
its would-be challengers:
Defiant members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement kept up protests
in Tiananmen Square on Saturday after the banned group marked the Year
of the Dragon with one of its biggest demonstrations on the vast plaza.
Plainclothes police swarmed the square, detaining at least half a dozen
people, the morning after scores of Falun Gong protesters tried to unfurl
Buddhist banners near China’s most prominent flagpole bearing the na-
tional standard.
As lunar New Year’s revelers looked on, police swooped across the
square and detained more than 100 people, kicking and punching some,
witnesses said.…Despite the beatings, Falun Gong members kept up
chants of “Falun Dafa” — “Great Law of the Wheel” — even inside the de-
tention centre. The demonstration is the latest evidence that a nationwide
crackdown has failed to crush members’ allegiance to the group which
China’s Communist leaders banned in July last year and labeled an “evil
cult” in October. Authorities have done their utmost to keep Falun Gong
members from the capital, checking identity cards at railway and bus sta-
tions, and setting up roadblocks on routes into the city. They have handed
out harsh jail sentences to Falun Gong leaders, and detained thousands of
members. Yet Falun Gong has been attempting ever bolder acts of protest.
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Last month [February 2000], members tried to hang a giant portrait of
their U.S.-based guru, Li Hongzhi, over the painting of Mao Zedong which
overlooks the square, the Information Centre of Human Rights and Dem-
ocratic Movement in China has reported.15 (my emphasis)
As this news report indicates, intense state repression may work to radical ize
— rather than eliminate — popular protest. This phenomenon has already
begun to receive some attention in the literature on social movements,16 but
the ways in which state practices themselves encourage imitation by protesters
remains under-appreciated. The provocative substitution of Buddhist banners
for the national flag and of Master Li’s portrait for that of Chairman Mao suggest
the tremendous temptations that the official trappings of state hold even for
those who rise up to challenge the powers-that-be.
The tendency for protesters to take cues from official symbols of authority
can be found in any polity, but it is particularly pronounced in authoritarian
systems where the state exercises a virtual monopoly over political discourse.
In such contexts, the clever appropriation and inversion of officially sanctioned
rituals and ceremonies for subversive purposes is a prominent feature of pro-
test behavior. In China, where popular protest is culturally sanctioned and
where the custom of “waving the red flag to oppose the red flag” has an ancient
pedigree that long predates the Communist era, this practice has been honed
into a high — and often highly ironic — art form.
Just as various democratic political cultures have given definition to distinc-
tive French, English, and American repertoires of collective action, so authori-
tarian societies also manifest identifiable styles of protest. In China, the ironic
invocation (and, through puns, the inversion) of official rhetoric, the creative
use of historical allegory, and the counter-hegemonic commemoration of state-
sponsored holidays are exceptionally well-developed means of challenging au-
thority (just as Russian political culture is famed for its sardonic jokes). China
offers rich material from which to develop a better understanding of such phe-
nomena, while serving at the same time to exemplify a more general type of po-
litical system in which the boundaries between state and society are less starkly
drawn than in liberal democracies. Although China (with the exception of con-
temporary Taiwan) has never enjoyed democratic rule, it has experienced a vari-
ety of authoritarian regimes: imperial, Republican, and Communist.
Those who hold the reins of power in Beijing today are of course acutely
aware of this historical record. It is precisely in light of the familiar Chinese past
— including the history of the Chinese Communist Party itself — that the re-
gime’s seemingly inconsistent and illogical responses to contemporary protests
become explicable. While popular protest in China bears a definite resem-
blance to unrest in other authoritarian polities, the differences are also stark
and significant. Sidney Tarrow writes of authoritarian states in general:
That authoritarian states discourage popular politics is implicit in their very
definition. In particular, they suppress the sustained interaction of collective
actors and authorities that is the hallmark of social movements.…Repressive
states depress collective action of a conventional and confrontational
sort, but leave themselves open to unobtrusive mobilization.17
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Like other authoritarian societies, the PRC has certainly witnessed the devel-
opment of what James Scott terms a “hidden transcript” of critical dissent.18
But Communist China parts company with these other countries in having
periodically encouraged — indeed compelled — its citizens to express their
private criticisms publicly in the form of big-character posters, struggle ses-
sions, denunciation meetings, demonstrations, and the like. The Cultural
Revolution was the most dramatic, albeit certainly not the only, instance of
this effort. The Communist state’s sponsorship of mass campaigns is related
to a fundamental tenet of Chinese political culture that links effecti ve popu-
lar protest and political legitimacy. Although Mao’s mass line departs signifi-
cantly from Mencius’s Mandate of Heaven, they share the belief that “to rebel
is justified.”
Repercussions
State sponsorship of public criticism in China has had a number of important
repercussions. For one thing, ordinary Chinese are simply more familiar with
modes of collective protest than we would expect of a population living under
such tight political supervision. Ritualized as some aspects of mass criticism
became during the Cultural Revolution, these routines nonetheless consti-
tuted part of a rich repertoire of protest techniques available to city dwellers
and country folk alike. Public experience with protest may well explain why it
was China that got the revolutionary ball rolling across the Communist world
in 1989. It surely helps explain how the Tiananmen protesters proved so
skillful at capturing worldwide attention with their dramatic actions: festive
marches complete with colorful banners and stirring music; stinging attacks
on political authorities in wall posters, speeches, and televised debates; even
somber hunger strikes — all found precedents in earl ier, elite-inspired
campaigns.
Yet ultimately the voicing of the hidden transcript proved far more unsettling
elsewhere in the Communist world than turned out to be the case for China.
Precisely because protest was both routine and officially circumscribed, once
the top leadership initiated a clear course of repression most of the populace
was quick to fall into step — with concerns for personal safety and perhaps sta-
bility rapidly overshadowing the euphoria of public criticism. After all, this too
was a familiar drill — harking back to the anti-rightist campaign of 1957, the mil-
itary suppression of Cultural Revolution mass activism in 1969, the clearing of
Tiananmen Square in April 1976, and the clampdown on Democracy Wall in
1979. In China, unlike Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, both leaders and or-
dinary citizens knew how to put the genie of mass protest back into the bottle of
state socialism.
What this augurs for the future is of course impossible to predict with confi-
dence. Certainly the post-Mao reforms are generating new pretexts for protest,
as concerns about excessive taxes and factory closures have joined long-stand-
ing resentment toward official privilege and bureaucratic corruption. Equally
significant, the opportunities for forming cross-class and cross-regional coali-
tions are expanding apace with the unraveling of many of the state-imposed
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controls of the Maoist era. Much will depend upon the way in which the govern-
ment authorities choose to respond to the growing unrest in both cities and
countryside. Regardless of how the evolving tensions play out, however, up-
coming scenarios are certain to bear the imprint of past practices — including
those of Chinese Communism itself.
Maoist initiatives continue to influence modes of thought and behavior in the
contemporary post-Mao period, but in many ways China today resembles the
China of the Republican — or even the late imperial — era more than it does the
China of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. As markets reemerge and state-erected so-
cial barriers crumble, class relations are reconfigured in a manner that may well
rekindle the fires of rebellion and revolution that burned so brightly in an ear-
lier age. The powerful cross-cutting social coalitions of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were in part a product of relatively weak state capacity,
but more importantly they also reflected the appearance of new social classes
(e.g., an industrial proletariat) and new social identities (e.g., youths and
women).
These developments had momentous implications for the nature of protest,
helping give rise to such massive and politically significant events as the May
Fourth Movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925, and the Civil
War unrest of the late 1940s. Under the Republic, the notion of urban citizen-
ship (shiminquan) took on special meaning, implying a new and powerful
claim for urban residents of all social classes to participate in local politics.
Fueled by an alliance of intellectuals, workers, and merchants, successive waves
of popular contention during the first half of this century constituted a dramatic
turning point in Chinese history.
Although these expressions of newfound community and discontent paved
the way for the victory of Communism, the Maoist state reversed such trends, se-
verely constraining the possibility of cross-class initiatives. In a manner to which
his imperial predecessors aspired, but never fully attained, Mao proved amaz-
ingly adept at limiting potentially threatening societal interaction.
During the Maoist period, a rigid household registration system (hukou
zhidu) was imposed that severely restricted migration and effectively severed
relations between villagers and urbanites. Moreover, within cities separate
places of recreation were established for workers and intellectuals, while the
bourgeoisie was virtually eliminated. Gone were the teahouses and cafes
that had served as meeting places for members of different classes during the
Republican era. Workers now spent their leisure time at workers’ cultural
palaces, while intellectuals congregated at writers’ and artists’ associations.
In the post-Mao period, the breakdown of these social restrictions may once
again encourage cross-class alliances with a potential for political ly powerful
collective action.
Much has changed over the past half century, of course, from cultural values
to technological advances. And yet, to the extent to which popular protest and
political legitimacy remain inextricably linked in the public mind, we can antici-
pate that future generations of Chinese may also rise up to challenge the Man-
date of Heaven.
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